So in our ongoing attempt to prove that the only sure foundation for our worldview is God, we have now unsuccessfully attempted to build our house of knowledge on the world (See “The Clash: Metaphysics”). There yet remains, however, the argument for building our worldview on man, or on ourselves. I am skipping over several lectures again both because in the logical progression of how I have been presenting the material, this lecture comes next, and because if I leave it too much longer I might very well forget it entirely. Next to Metaphysics, it is this lecture on Epistemology that most strained my mind, and therefore solidified itself as one of my favorites of the week.
As with metaphysics, we will begin with the simple definition of epistemology: our theory of knowing. For this argument, we turn to the great philosopher Rene Descartes. In attempt to find out what he could build his house of knowledge upon, Descartes devised a method of doubt. His idea was that if he could doubt everything he possibly could, that which remained would be that on which he could build his worldview. He decided to doubt everything he could and see what was left.
The first thing he stripped away was all his senses. He allowed for the possibility that he could be dreaming. This thought process would like something like this: “Everything I see and hear and feel now seems to be real, but all these senses also seems to be real when I am dreaming. Therefore how do I know that I am not now dreaming?” So the senses were the first to go, leaving only that which was in his mind. Next he took away all arithmetic, arguing there is always the possibility of mistakes, or there is a theoretical possibility of a deceptive god causing him to be mistaken. All these things could be doubted. His great conclusion is quoted as follows:
“But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no mind, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition,
I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.” And so was born the great philosophical argument known as the
Cogito:
I think, therefore I am.If the Descartes’ quote doesn’t make sense to you, stay with me. All he is saying is that even if there WAS something out there deceiving him into thinking everything incorrectly about the universe, there still has to be a
him to deceive. Supreme-Being-X can’t deceive Descartes if Descartes doesn’t exist.
And so we arrive again at what seems to be a working argument for the existence of self without first presupposing the existence of God. But there are still a few unanswered questions. Here we go:
First, we must separate the
Cogito into a syllogism, which is simply a logical structure. Our syllogism for Descartes’
Cogito looks like this:
Major Premise: Whatever thinks, exists.
Minor Premise: I think.
Conclusion: Therefore, I exist.For the sake of argument, let’s accept the major premise, but we must ask Descartes: “Do you have any concept of what ‘I’ means in the minor premise?” And again for the sake of argument, Descartes replies: “’I’ means ‘a thinking thing.’” If this is the definition of “I,” then the syllogism becomes:
Major Premise: Whatever thinks, exists.
Minor Premise: A thinking thing thinks.
Conclusion: Therefore, a thinking thing exists.This conclusion is now very different from our first conclusion, though. We have proven that
something exists, but we have not proven that this
something is Descartes, or “I.”
But what if Descartes didn’t know what “I” was? What if he answered to our question: “No, I don’t know what ‘I’ means in the minor premise.” The problem then becomes that if you don’t know what “I” means in the minor premise, then you certainly don’t know what “I” means in the conclusion. This may conclude that Descartes exists, but it does not in any way answer what exactly Descartes
is. He clearly does not know himself as a specific individual. If the sole definition of Descartes is “a thinking thing,” but Brian Whalen is also “a thinking thing,” how is Brian Whalen different from Descartes? Are they the same being?
The point here is that the argument becomes confusing when we use personal pronouns, because they are subjective. It is just the same as using a demonstrative pronoun: you might as well say “This thinks” to a blind person, and expect them to know exactly what you are talking about. Remember that Descartes has doubted the existence of his senses – he has no external context by which to define “I.”
So Descartes fails. But what if Descartes was incorrect in his decision to rule out all his senses? Could not the argument work if we provide an external context for “I”? Let’s try it out. Let’s claim that Brian Whalen’s present space-time position is part of his essential definition and distinguishes him as an individual. My definition may therefore become: a thinking thing that is sitting at his computer desk in his room at 11:00 PM on August 14, 2007. I have successfully distinguished myself from all other thinking things, since no other being can occupy the same space at the same time. But if this is my definition, what happens when it becomes 11:01 PM? Have I ceased to be Brian Whalen? What if I walk down to the bathroom? Have I then ceased to be Brian Whalen? I must then be a different being at every instant of every day.
Okay, so I have to expand the definition of myself to include all the spaces and times I will ever occupy. Then a new problem arises – I can only occupy one point and one time. “If my future space-time properties are part of my essential definition, then I do not yet fit the description of what I essentially am. I am not yet myself.” Even bigger than this problem, however, is that in order to know myself truly, I must know the entire course of my entire life. When I admit that I do
not know the course of my entire life, I admit that I do not really know myself at all.
The biggest problem with defining myself by my space-time position is yet to be said: “If I am, by definition… the-being-that-sits-at-his-desk-in-his-room-at-11:00-PM… then it would be a logical contradiction for me to be anywhere else at that time.” My space-time position becomes a necessary fact rather than a contingent fact. But everyone would agree that my space-time position is a contingent fact: I could have chosen to be somewhere else at that time without ceasing to be myself. So I cannot define myself
without my space-time position, but neither can I define myself
with my space-time position.
And so again we must find ourselves turning to a presupposition of God if we are to know anything about ourselves or anything at all. If we allow for God and the possibility of hypothetical necessity (as talked about in Metaphysics), then we may say that all of my space-time properties are not only known by God, but decreed by God. Nathan writes that “the meaning of any thing—its origin, duration, and destiny,
its essence as well as its existence—consists in its place in God’s plan. To know what a thing is, is to know its place in the plan of God.”
I end, as Nathan did, with a summary quote from John Calvin:
“Nearly all the wisdom we possess, that is to say, true and sound wisdom, consists of two parts: knowledge of God and of ourselves. But, while joined by many bonds, which one precedes and brings forth the other is not easy to discern. In the first place, no one can look upon himself without immediately turning his thoughts to the contemplation of God, in whom he ‘lives and moves’ [Acts 17:28]… Again,
it is certain that man never achieves a clear knowledge of himself unless he has first looked upon God’s face, and then descends from contemplating him to scrutinize himself…Yet, however the knowledge of God and of ourselves are mutually connected, the order of right teaching requires that we discuss the former first, then proceed afterward to treat the latter.”
I repeat my appeal for feedback and thoughts on the manner in which I have presented this material. I repeat my complete lack of original thoughts for the actual content of this post, and give all due credit to Nathan Sasser and the many men on whose thoughts he himself stood. I do continue to hope, however, that I have served to clarify rather than confuse.